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Cui bono?
A new corporate vehicle
for the public sector
by Philip Goldenberg
The author puts the case for the creation of a new corporate structure   the 
public benefit organisation (PBO)   to provide a vehicle for the 
decentralisation of public services. This article follows on from Philip 
Goldenberp-'s Editorial in this issue which looks at issues relating to theC> O
private finance initiative and the public/private partnership.
THE PROBLEM
All three main political parties are looking seriously at 
the decentralisation of public services and, in this context, 
at forms of corporate vehicle which might be suitable for 
this purpose. Indeed, a number of think tanks and 
individuals have had a stab at this, with varying degrees of7 > o o
accuracy and penetration.
The problem is that no existing corporate structure 
exactly matches what is required. Those requirements are 
as follows.
(i) A body which has a separate legal personality
(ii) A body which can provide services and (where 
applicable) charge for them, and indeed make a 
profit.
(iii) A body whose members do not have an economic 
interest in the outcome of its activities (with no 
power to its members to change this), and which 
accordingly has a 'stewardship' ethos.
(iv) A body which can be substantial in a financial 
sense, and accordingly can (a) be founded with 
core capital and (b) raise loan capital from the 
public.
(v) A body wrhose sphere of activity, while having social 
objectives, is not necessarily charitable (and indeed 
whose activities might not sit comfortably within 
the framework of charity law even if the scope of 
charitable activity was extended   e.g. a railway 
company).
(vi) A body which can remunerate not only its 
executive management but also (to a reasonable 
extent) its non-executive directors.
(vii) A bodv which can be accountable to a number of 
'stakeholders' and whose non-executive directors 
can be nominated by particular stakeholders while 
remaining accountable to the body for their 
conduct of its affairs.
Figure 1 shows the various existing structures and their 
respective incompatibilities with the features set out 
above.
A SOLUTION
The opportunity should be taken in the forthcoming 
Companies Bill to give effect to the proposals of the recent 
Company Law Review to create, within the broad 
structure of company legislation, a public benefit 
organisation (PBO) structure with the following features 
(each of which is separately explained below).
(1) A PBO should be a form of company limited by 
guarantee.
In order that a PBO can be easily formed by those 
concerned (without the needjbr complex Parliamentary or 
administrative processes), it must be capable of 
incorporation by registration; this means it must be a 
Companies Act company. The members of the PBO will 
have no economic interest in it, and accordingly a 
shareholding structure would be inappropriate.
(2) A PBO should be subject to the present regime for
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charitable companies, namely have no power to 
distribute dividends or capital to its members, and 
be able to transfer its assets only to another PRO 
(except by special permission of the regulator).
A PRO should not be a charity, as it may well be carrying 
on commercial activities; however, any profit it makes will 
be available Jor re-investment but notjbr distribution. In 
the event of its liquidation, its assets should not bejreely 
transferable into the private sector. The regulator is 
described in paragraph 9.
(3) Unlike a normal company limited by guarantee, a 
PBO should have power to make an offer to the 
public for debt (but not equity) capital.
Only a public company may make an offer of securities to 
the public, and by definition a company limited by 
guarantee cannot be a public company. It is, however, 
desirable that a PBO should be able to raise public debt 
capital outside Treasury control, even though the 
compromise recently announced between the Secretary of 
State Jor Health and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
would seem sadly to rule this out.
(4) A PBO may not create fixed charges over specific 
assets.
This obviates one of the Treasury objections to a PBO-type 
vehicle which can raise public debt capital. In the event of 
insolvency, no mortgagee will be able to claimJixed assets, such 
as property or machinery.
(5) The only form of permitted insolvency for a PBO 
will be administration; this is to facilitate the 
transfer pi its assets to another PBO. Following 
such transfer, the normal liquidation provisions 
will apply.
Any such administration would take priority over the ability of 
ajloating chargee to crystallise its charge into a Jixed charge. 
Effectively, the Administrator would be able to transfer the 
PBO's assets and undertaking to another PBOJree and clear 
of any charges (but obviously on an arm's-length basis), while 
of course the proceeds of such transfer would Jirst be available 
to the Jloating chargee. This would enable a hospital, Jor 
example, to carry on without disturbance.
(6) Any other form of Companies Act company may be
converted into a PBO, but not vice versa.
This is obviously to facilitate the creation of PBOs, while 
preventing their effective privatisation.
(7) Any transfer of an undertaking to a PBO will be 
exempt from stamp duty.
It would seem strange Jor monies to pass to the Treasury when 
assets are being transferred into the public sector.
(8) A public body (e.g. an NHS Trust) will be able to 
transfer its undertaking to a PBO, subject to 
Parliamentary approval by positive instrument. In 
due course, a similar procedure will apply to tiers 
of Regional Government.
At the moment the route is primary legislation or Executive 
action. It would seem sensible to have a standard procedure 
which requires Parliamentary approval without the need Jor a 
Jull legislative process.
(9) In administrative terms, PBOs would need 
regulatory supervision, which could best be 
provided by a dedicated unit within Companies 
House, with ultimate supervision by the High 
Court. PBOs would also need a discrete set of 
accounting standards.
Because the PBO will be a Companies Act company, this seems 
the logical solution.
CONCLUSION
While this is not a topic where there is a single right 
answer, it is hoped that the foregoing will be a useful 
starting-point as civil servants and Parliamentary 
draftspersons begin to wrestle with the task of converting 
a political concept into coherent legislation. 
Philip Goldenberg
The author is a Partner in City solicitors S J Berwin, specialising in 
company law. He was a member of the recent Liberal Democrat Policy 
Working Group on Public Services, and one of his contributions was to 
devise thejorm of PBO described in this article.
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